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TOWARD THE QUESTION OF ESTIMATING
THE ACTIVITY OF RONALD REAGAN,
A FORMER U.S.PRESIDENT
Dr. S.Ishdorj
It is impossible to elucidate in this small paper multi-sided activity of Ronald
Reagan who was a President of the United States for eight years. Therefore I
would give you a brief account of his activity mostly connected with relations of
two super-powers.
As a result of 1980 presidential election in America from Republican Party
Ronald Reagan became a President of the United States.
In most works of the American scholars and historians the Reagan internal
and external policy activities were estimated as conservative, because he chal-
lenged both at home and abroad. But more or less positive estimation of his
activity was given in the works of some other American scholars published in
recent years, hi 1984 Reagan was re-elected as a President of the United States
of America.
The time was complicated and difficult when Reagan first took the office.
The 1970s detente ended. The Soviet Union taking an advantage of priority in
balance of forces pursued a so-called “offensive” foreign policy and weakened
U.S. positions in Southeast Asia, in the near and Middle East, in Africa and
Central America in particular. Moreover, at the end of 1970s the Soviets de-
ployed their SS-20 missiles in Eastern Europe and in December 1979 the Soviet
Army committed an invasion onto Afghanistan.
Besides, the Soviet Union together with the Cuban Leadership supporting
Nicaraguan Sandinistas and left forces of the other Central American countries
encouraged them in taking adventurous actions in order to spread communism
over this region.
All these actions of the Soviets and others naturally worsened relations
between the two super-powers.
Reagan demanded that the Soviet Union should remove its SS-20 missiles
from Eastern Europe and promote the arms control negotiations to reach suc-
cesses. But Reagan’s demand was not met by the Soviets.
In such circumstances, when the Soviets only leaned upon strength, the
Reagan Administration had no other way than to take a decisive on reaching
equality and prevailing in balance of forces.
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Hi the first term of his presidency (1981-1984) Reagan paid main attention
to internal matters of the country. For the purpose of reaching an equality and
priority in balance of forces he mobilized financial and economic reserves of the
country as well as intellects and abilities of the American people. He also drew a
necessary attention on the country’s foreign policy.
Reagan stated that he would talk tough to the Soviet Union and take a firm
position toward it. He hurled insults at the Soviet Union calling it: “an evil
Empire”, and it “attempts to restore Asian hordes” and so oh.
hi the fields of economy Reagan carried out a policy on making Americans
rely more on the private sector and less on the federal Government, on sharp
reducing high percent inflation and cutting taxes. All this brought many nega-
tive consequences than positive results. His policy of increasing the productiv-
ity by means of encouraging the private sector failed. Reagan reduced spending
for social programs, and dramatically increased spending off defense.
Reagan revived two- weapons systems-the MX missile and B-l bomber
which had been cancelled by the Carter Administration. He ordered to produce
Trident submarines and allowed American arms manufactures to sell arms at the
record level.
Space-based Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) proposed by Reagan in
March 1983 was the most expensive weapons system ever devised. The United
States became to spend annually 200-300 billion dollars for defense.
This large increase of spending for defense roused the budget deficit and
the growth in the National debt. The budget deficit in its turn led to the reduc-
tion of investment in modernizing business. American productivity declined,
leaving the United States less able to compete with such countries as Japan and
West Germany. Even the United States became to borrow money from these
countries in carrying out the SDI program. The country was importing more than
exporting.
Living standards of the population brought down and the lives of families
with fewer incomes became to experience difficulties.
Inside the country Reagan was subjected to severe criticism and accusa-
tion, hi the second term of his presidency he continued to fulfill the SDI pro-
gram.
Despite such not an easy situation Reagan managed to achieve his goal of
getting an equality and even superiority in the balance of forces that would be
one of the conditions for a successfully carrying out his policy on the interna-
tional arena. Simultaneously he underlined that U.S. priority in the balance of
forces would not mean to unleash war with the other super-power.
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By 1985 cur-relation of nuclear forces between the two super-powers and
between the two military alliances-NATO and WTO was as follows: In strategic
weapons, the United States had more than 9,000 nuclear warheads on bombers
and missiles, the Soviet Union more than 7,000. These were aimed at targets
inside the other super-power’s homelands. In theater nuclear weapons, the So-
viet Union had 3,580 of all types (land-and sea-based) directed at targets in
Western Europe, while NATO had 4,445 (including 98 French and 64 British
theater nuclear missiles) aimed at Eastern Europe and the Western sections of
Soviet Union.
In response to the Soviet emplacement of more than 345 SS-20 missiles
(modern intermediate-range weapons with three nuclear warheads each) the
United States accordance with the NATO decision started to deploy 500 Ameri-
can cruise missiles in Western Europe.
The basic approach of the Reagan Administration policy on the interna-
tional arena was to correct the shattered position of the United States and take
again a leading place in the world, and to put end to the Cold war which had been
continued for several decades.
The Cold/war was a political, economic, ideological, military and diplo-
matic struggle between “capitalist” and “socialist” systems. The United States
of America was at head of the “capitalist” system and the Soviet Union headed
the “socialist” one.
In the Cold war under false pretense of “peaceful co-existence of the coun-
tries with different social systems” and “peaceful competition” the two super-
powers in reality attempted to go get a priority in balance of forces and while
doing so weakened an influence and position of the one in some parts of the
world, and enlarged and strengthened its influence and position.
Reagan considered the policy on an endless continuation of the Cold war
and “containment” of the Soviet Union to be meaningless.
The most important task for him was to avoid nuclear war. His statement:
“A nuclear war cannot win and must never be fought” witnessed to this.
Then, Reagan believed that the task for ending the Cold war policy would
be reached by means of normalization and improvement of relations between the
two super-powers, stopping their interference in conflicts of the third countries,
conclusion of treaties on arms reduction and control, and by changing the
social systems in “socialist” countries. This last point of changing social sys-
tems in communist countries would not be done from abroad, but only be carried
out by the people of a giving country.
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In the circumstances when any of the “socialist” countries chooses the
road of social transformation and market economy system the United Stated
would not be in position of watching, but would render the giving country an
economic and other assistance in overcoming its difficulties.
Reagan, U.S. President began to take some steps toward ending the Cold
war policy.
In 1983-1984 when U.S.-Soviet relations sharply worsened the Reagan
Administration sent the Soviet leadership a message, in which the United States
expressed its desire to normalize American-Soviet relations and was still inter-
ested in negotiating their differences. But Soviet propagandists accused Reagan
of blaming all the ills of tensions in bilateral relations and on an international
arena and rejected the American initiative on good cause, as means of disap-
pointing the world public.
In connection of worsening the U.S.-Soviet relations there were written in
our propaganda of that time that Reagan was a “warmonger” and wanted to
“unleash war” and etc. All those writings of our propaganda did not at all corre-
spond to the complete reality. Indeed, Reagan was not a warmonger and he had
no desire to be in war with the other super-power.
One of his attempts to put an end to the Cold war was Reagan’s speech in
June 1987 in West Berlin. He goaded Gorbachev, when he challenged him to
“tear down” the Berlin Wall. To most observers, it seemed to’ be an irresponsible
provocation, as almost no one in the world expected the Berlin Wall to tear down
in the 20th century or even the twenty first.
But the Reagan speech was not a provocation, he had looked through an
event which should take place in the nearest future as a step to ending the Cold
war. The Berlin Wall symbolized as a statue of the Cold war which could be
considered as a small “iron curtain” inside a large iron curtain. Therefore his
calling Gorbachev to tear down the Wall contained thought of great importance
that would be proved by coming events of that time.
An important step to ending the cold war became a transition of the two
super-powers into negotiations on improving relations between them and con-
clusion of a certain treaty on arms reduction and control.
Substitution of the old Soviet leadership by M.Gorbachev, a man with new
thinking to carry out social and economic reform in his country favorably influ-
enced on normalizing and improving U.S.-Soviet relations, on negotiating to
stop arms race, reduce arms, and conclude an agreement or treaty.
Gorbachev believed that normalization and improvement of Soviet-Ameri-
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can relations would help him to reduce military expenditures and promote his
social and economic reform in the country.
During the second term of his presidency Reagan stopped hurling insults
at the Soviet Union. He was sure that, like Nixon had opened the door to China
he could start with the Soviets to negotiate on arms reduction. At the same time
Nancy Reagan urged her husband to negotiate with the Soviets so that he
would be known in American history as a “peace president”. If he could do it
nobody dared to accuse him of being soft on communism and neglecting the
national security. There were also other people who had the same opinion.
Reagan and Gorbachev met four times in summits (in 1985-Geneva, in
1986- Reykjavik, in 1987-Washington and in 1988-Moscow) each of these meet-
ings had its significance.
As one of the points of agenda at Geneva summit meeting the United
States has prepared a proposal on stopping Soviet-American involvement in
conflicts of the third world along with the questions of improving relations of
the super-powers and of arms reduction and control. The American proposal
consisted of:
a) Both countries would encourage parties to regional conflicts to start
negotiations for a peaceful settlement;
b)  Once negotiations took hold, U.S. and Soviet representatives would
decide how to halt the flow of arms to the parties from the outside;
c) When peace was established in the area, the United States and Soviet
Union    would    cooperate    in    assisting    economic reconstruction.
At the Geneva summit Gorbachev rejected Reagan’s proposals on stop-
ping Soviet-U.S. involvement in the third countries, on guarantee of human
rights and free exchange of people between them, but he only accepted Reagan’s
proposal on developing and enlarging Soviet-American trade and cultural rela-
tions.
Paying his main attention to arms reduction Gorbachev proposed Reagan
to refuse from deploying American cruise missiles in Western Europe and in that
case he would remove the Soviet SS-2O intermediate-range missiles from East-
ern Europe while leaving such number of missiles equal to numbers of French
and English missiles. Reagan rejected this proposal. Simultaneously Gorbachev
asked Reagan to refuse from carrying out “Strategic Defense Initiative”. In re-
sponse to his request American President explained that if the arms control talks
failed, SDI would substitute this failure and therefore, he could not refuse from
SDI.
 Number 5, 1998
86
The Mongolian Journal of International Affairs
So, any agreement or treaty was not signed at Geneva summit and only a
joint Statement was published.
But it would be a mistake to consider the Geneva summit as a failure.
Altogether 2-3 years before the Soviet-American relations had been on the brink
of war now as a result of the summit meeting the tensions were weakened and
the two super-powers in some extents have already found a common language.
The joint Statement underlined that the two countries in their relations would
“prevent war whether nuclear or conventional, or any other war between them”.
It was an event of great importance.
In early fall of 1986 Gorbachev sent Reagan a secret message in which he
proposed a quick “preparatory” short meeting be held in a third country. He
suggested Reykjavik, Iceland. As the preparatory* meeting was destined for a
Washington summit Reagan agreed to Gorbachev’s suggestion. On November
11 and 12, 1986 they met in Reykjavik and had talks. For Gorbachev, arms reduc-
tion and control was the key issue, for Reagan was important, but only a part of
broader agenda.
Gorbachev presented a detailed proposal for a comprehensive arms reduc-
tion and control agreement in which, gradually he was making major conces-
sions. But his proposal offered very little in the other points of agenda. In his
proposal Gorbachev was accepting the U.S. proposal for 50 percent reduction in
heavy land-based missiles, low numbers of intermediate-range missiles, broad
on-site inspection.
At the afternoon session of second day only two issues of principle re-
mained. Firstly, Gorbachev had proposed to eliminate all nuclear weapons by
the year 2000, while Reagan had offered to eliminate all ballistic missiles. Sec-
ondly, Gorbachev insisted all researches on strategic defense be confined to
laboratories, to which Reagan didn’t agree. He explained that testing outside
laboratories would be essential to the program.
In order to appease the Soviet leader Reagan accepted Gorbachev’s pro-
posal for eventual elimination of nuclear weapons but fused on SDI testing.
Gorbachev stated that he would fulfill his proposal of accepting the U.S.
positions on condition that the agreement precludes the .sudden deployment of
strategic defenses by the United States.
Since laboratory research was more important than testing in space at that
stage of research in both of countries, the United States have accepted some
limitations without crippling the program.
The Reykjavik meeting carved the way for a conclusion of new treaty next
year.
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In July, 1987 in Geneva the Soviets presented a new arms reduction pro-
posal, to which the United States agreed. It called for a world wide elimination of
all U.S. and Soviet short-and medium-range missiles.
In December, 1987 Gorbachev visited to Washington. Here in American
Capital at a summit meeting Gorbachev and Reagan signed the intermediate
nuclear force treaty, which called for dismantling and destruction of all short-
and medium-range missiles, with provisions for a system of independent, on-
site verification and weapons inspection.
This INF Treaty was a great breakthrough in the cold war. It also could be
considered as a large step toward ending the cold war. Gorbachev and Reagan
solved more disputed problems than leaders of the two super-powers had at any
previous U.S.-Soviet meetings.
The treaty is considered as an event of great importance in present inter-
national political life. Many questions, connected with world peace and security
now and in future will be solved only through the way of the INF Treaty.
In spring of 1988 Ronald Reagan visited Moscow. The talks and negotia-
tions between Gorbachev and Reagan on reduction of strategic weapons ended
without results. The reasons for this were: the latent persistence of conserva-
tives on both sides, the strength of legacy of mutual mistrust and limits on the
powers of two leaders.
The most decisive factor in ending the cold war was a change of social
systems in communist countries. When Reagan visited Moscow Gorbachev’s
reform entered the fourth year since its beginning.
At this time the final goal of the Gorbachev reform was still indefinite.
Despite Gorbachev’s public statement of transition into multiparty system, plu-
ralism and market economy the Soviet society tested many negative facts such
as a decline of discipline, disorders, increase of hard drinkers and crimes, hi
brief, the Soviet society tested not an easy situation.
Taking onto an account of these circumstances Reagan evidently decided
to encourage Soviet public toward human rights, freedom and democracy.
On the other side, Gorbachev’s social and economic reform naturally at-
tracted the attention of foreign countries, first of all, the United States.
Therefore, when Reagan’s stated goal or reduction of strategic weapons
was not reached, he decided to promote the Gorbachev’s reform.
During one of the breaks in his meeting with Gorbachev the two leaders
strolled on Red Square. The crowd was sparse, since KGB security agents had
kept most tourists at distance, but Reagan greeted a couple with a baby and
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took it on his arms: typical act by a politician when cameras are around, but in
this case it seemed to symbolize much more. Realizing that he was in the sym-
bolic center of the Soviet Union, the American President demonstrated that
there are human qualities that unite all peoples. He was no longer dealing with a
hostile adversary but with human being struggling, as we were, to find the way
to a peaceful and more prosperous life.
Reagan used his free time and took an unscheduled walk along the Arbat
Street of Moscow, mixing the crowds. He got acquainted with the lives of ordi-
nary people and with the Russian culture and history.
When he called on American Embassy in Moscow and was met by 96
Soviet dissidents. Reagan received them and spoke with an address, in which he
stressed the necessity of defending the rights of individuals and establishing
democratic institutions in the Soviet Union.
At Moscow University he addressed to the students and stated that the
key to progress “is freedom-freedom of thought, freedom of information, and
freedom of communication”. Then he spoke on the necessity of combining the
concept of political and economic freedom with the Russian tradition, and in
conclusion of his address he once again outlined “his dream of a world without
barriers that obstruct travel and the interchange of ideas, much as he had in
Washington in the summer of 1984, when he had called for broadened U.S.-
Soviet cultural contact”.
Andrei Voznesensky, Soviet poet, characterizing Reagan’s visit to Mos-
cow at that time said: “Reagan’s visit is one of the greatest event in all of
Russian history... Reagan’s words and gestures had emboldened reformers
throughout the country. Russian intellectuals had habitually doubted the ca-
pacity of their own country to absorb democracy, but Ronald Reagan, a man
who could not be accused of closing his eyes to Soviet reality, had faith in them.
That would encourage Soviet citizens to put an end to their traditional political
passivity and start taking their future into their own hands”.
In brief, Ronald Reagan, American President made a very deep impression
on the Soviet public. No single visit of a foreign statesman could have such a
profound impact on a nation’s self-confidence as to alter the course of its his-
tory. At the same time, there was something to what Voznesensky said. Reagan’s
encouragement of democracy in the Soviet Union came at critical time, and his
earlier no-nonsense condemnation of communism gave his words of encour-
agement a credibility that less outspoken public figures could not command.
Recently Ronald Reagan’s activity has been becoming to be estimated
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positively and his popularity is increasing. An evident proof of this was the
result of American voters’ poll. Concerning estimation of the activities of nine
U.S. Presidents from Herbert Hoover to Ronald Reagan (John Kennedy who
worked for three years as a president and who was assassinated not included
here) the voters’ poll showed that three out of four voters had judged only three
presidents (Franklin Roosevelt, Dwight Eisenhower, and Ronald Reagan) as
competent.
So, Ronald Reagan’s activity had both of dark and bright sides. Despite 3
trillion dollars’ national debt, despite Iran-contra, despite severe domestic scan-
dals and criticism, despite his flip-flops from arms builder to arms destroyer and
from seeing the men in the Kremlin as the focus of evil in the world to becoming
the number-one fan of Gorbachev Reagan had also bright sides in his activity of
U.S. President. Now the American people began to estimate the bright sides of
his activity. The most important bright side of the Ronald Reagan activities as a
U.S. President was fulfillment of if not eighty, but not less than sixty or seventy
percent of his tasks for putting an end to the cold war.
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